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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Rodney C. Rose, appeals from an order 
granting respondent's motion to dismiss entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent's motion to dismiss the appellant's petition 
for writ of habeas corpus was granted by the judge after the 
hearing. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an aff irmation of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
order dismissing a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n for wri t of habeas 
corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant, Rodney C. Rose, was judged and sen-, 
tenced on a charge of sale of a stimulating drug on April 13, 
1972. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah. The Court affirmed the conviction on April 26, 1973, 
State v. Rose (No. 12974 unpublished). The appellant then 
brought a habeas corpus action in the Second Judicial District 
Court. That writ was denied. The appellant then filed a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. That petition was dismissed 
by Judge Willis W. Ritter. Appellant then filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District, which 
the Court dismissed. The issues raised in the petition to the 
Third District Court were identical to the issues raised in 
appellant's petition previously filed in the Second District Court. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT HAD PREVIOUSLY RAISED 
AND HAD AJUDICATED THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IN A PRIOR 
HABEAS CORPUS ACTION. 
The habeas corpus rule under which the present action 
was filed in the court below is Rule 65B(i) (1953, as amended). 
The rule reads in part as follows: 
"The complaint shall further 
state that the legality or consti-
tutionality of his commitment or 
confinement has not already been 
adjudged in a prior habeas corpus 
or other similar proceeding; and if 
the complainant shall have instituted 
prior similar proceedings in any court, 
state or federal, within the state of 
Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, 
shall attach a copy of any pleading filed 
in such court by him to his complaint, 
and shall set forth the reasons for the 
denial of relief in such other court. 
In such case, if it is apparent to the 
court in which the proceeding under 
this rule is instituted that the 
legality or constitutionality of his 
confinement has already been adjudged 
in such prior proceedings, the court 
-3-
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shall forthwith dismiss such complaint/ 
giving written notice thereof by mail 
to the complainant, and no further 
proceedings shall be had on such 
complaint." (Emphasis added.) 
As provided in Rule 65B (i), a habeas corpus action must be 
dismissed if the court determines that the "legality or con-
stitutionality" of the complaint of incarceration has been 
previously adjudged. The rule not only supports the action of 
the lower court in the present case, but requires it. 
Appellant presented basically three grounds for habeas 
corpus relief in the Third District Court: (a) insufficiency 
of the pleadings in that they did not contain the name of the 
party to whom a controlled substance was sold; (b) the crime 
for which he was convicted was classed as a felony, instead of 
a misdemeanor; and (c) his attorney's incompetence due to failure 
to perfect an appeal from the Second Judicial District decision 
denying habeas corpus. Each of these issues was raised in 
the previous habeas corpus petitions. 
In the previous Second Judicial District decision on 
# • 
habeas corpus, the appellant alleged the following: 
-4-
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 (a) The petitioner was charged 
in an information filed in the Captioned 
Court alleging the 'sale' of a 'stimulant 
drug1—amphetamine. 
(b) The indispensible question 
to whom the alleged 'sale1 was made 
remains unanswered by the Record in 
the instant case. 
* -k -k 
(1) By the attached controlling 
opinion of the majority of the Utah 
Supreme Court, it is apparent that the 
provision making the Sale of a Stimulant 
Drug . . . Punishable as a Misdemeanor — 
remained a part of the Laws of the State 
of Utah from 1967 to Jan. 1, 1972. 
It follows therefrom that the con" 
viction of the petitioner for a felony 
cannot stand." 
Each of these contentions were rejected upon a hearing 
before the Honorable Calvin Gould, who in part held that since 
the petitioner did not request a Bill of Particulars, the 
information was considered sufficient and that the crime was 
found to be a felony, not a misdemeanor. 
After this unsuccessful action, appellant filed a 
petition in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah, Central Division, in which he raised the above conten-
tions, and additionally alleged that his failure to perfect an 
appeal from the denial of habeas corpus relief by Judge Calvin 
-5-
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Gould was the r e s u l t of inef fec t ive ass i s t ance of counsel . 
In dismissing the act ion for f a i l u r e to exhaust s t a t e remedies, 
the federal court ruled that appe l l an t ' s fa i lu re t o exhaust 
s t a t e remedies was not a r e su l t of ineffect ive ass is tance of 
counsel* The Court s t a t e d : 
"In the present matter i t i s obvious 
from the face of Rose's p e t i t i o n that he 
was aware of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of h i s r i g h t 
to appeal the s t a t e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s 
opinion to the Utah Supreme Court. He 
fa i l ed to do so , and now blames h i s f a i l u r e 
on one of the ' t yp i ca l ravings ' of the 
ja i lhouse lawyer who prepared his s t a t e 
court p e t i t i o n . " Rose v. Smith, Civ i l No. 
C 74-76. 
The Court ruled further that appel lant had fa i led to make the 
required showing of incompetence, as se t for th in T o l l e t t v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
Appellant had previously l i t i g a t e d the issues he ra i sed 
in h i s habeas corpus act ion in the lower courts and his ac t ion 
was therefore properly dismissed. The dismissal required by 
Rule 65B(i) avoids the problems that occur when issues decided 
in one cause of act ion are the subject of a second cause of 
ac t ion . This view was expressed by t h i s Court in Bryant v> Turner, 
- 6 -
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19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967): 
"Moreover, after judgment is 
entered, there is assured a right of 
appeal within the proper time to 
seek redress for any such error or 
transgression of those rights. When 
this procedure has been followed the 
judgment should normally be final. 
It should not be subjected to a. 
continual merry-go-round of collateral 
attacks upon various and specious 
pretexts as some courts are prone to 
permit nowadays. In our opinion such 
an inconsiderate attitude toward final 
judgments regularly arrived at by 
courts of competent jurisdiction robs 
the law of the dignity and respect it 
is entitled to. It tends to degrade the 
whole process of law enforcement and the 
administration of justice and thus to under-
mine the good order of society it is pur-
posed to maintain." 
This view has also been expressed by the United 
States Supreme Court in cases which deal with the inappropriate -
ness of repetitious habeas corpus petitions. Two United States 
Supreme Court cases, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Murch 
v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), indicate that attempts by state 
prisoners to bring repetitious petitions are not to be approved 
v -7-
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when an orderly procedure exists for petitioners to follow. 
Such an orderly procedure exists in Utah for the filing of 
a single habeas corpus petition. The piecemeal and/or 
repetitious filing of petitions is uncalled for in light of 
Rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Thus, it is clear that appellant's writ of habeas 
corpus was correctly dismissed because the same issues had 
been raised and adjudicated in a prior habeas corpus action. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT RAISED OR SHOULD 
HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE OF SENTENCING IN HIS PREVIOUS APPEAL TO 
THIS COURT. 
Appellant's substantive contention in this appeal 
appears very much like the contention on appeal from appellant's 
original conviction. On appeal from conviction of the crime 
appellant argued that the drug named in the information, and 
upon which he stood convicted, "methamphetamine, '* was at 
variance with the charge upon which he was bound over to the 
district court, and with the evidence as to the drug he sold, 
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which was "amphetamine." This Court stated, "We are un-
impressed by this technical distinction and . . . affirm 
his conviction," State v. Rose/ supra. In this appeal, 
appellant contends that the sentence for violation of the 
statute was a misdemeanor and not a felony based on passage 
of the new statute between the date of appellant's prosecution 
and the date of sentencing. Thus, the ultimate issue in both 
cases dealt with the proper sentencing of appellant. If the 
court finds that the issues in both appeals are substantially 
similar, then this appeal is merely a substitute for the 
appellant's previous appeal, and, under Utah law, cannot be 
granted. Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968) ; 
Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967); Burleigh V. 
Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P.2d 412 (1968) ; Duran v. Turner, 
30 Utah 2d 249, 516 P.2d 353 (1973) ; Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 
27 Utah 2d 428, 498 P.2d 34 (1972). Nevertheless, if the 
issues are not substantially similar, then the question of 
proper sentencing under the new statute should have been 
raised in the first appeal, and by raising it now, appellant 
-9-
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has chosen the wrong time to challenge an issue which occurred 
months prior to his first appeal. Therefore, on either grounds, 
the petition was properly dismissed. 
Appellant knew of his right to appeal his sentence 
since the transcript reflects that "petitioner declined to 
have his penalty altered after that hearing contending that 
this might disrupt his parole schedule, and, therefore, asked 
the court to take no further action in the matter of penalty 
alteration." (Tr.45). Respondent wonders, in a situation like 
the present case, at what time in the proceedings "these peti-
tioners out at the prison are to be bound by what they say. . . ." 
(Tr.45). The trial judge also correctly analyzed appellant's 
position when he stated, "Assuming I deny his petition on the 
same issues (those raised in the Second District Court), are you 
saying that he has the right to go from one District to another 
filing one petition after another?" (Tr.42) . The trial judge 
correctly responded in the negative by dismissing appellant's 
petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus 
-10-
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raised issues that had previously been adjudicated in a 
habeas corpus proceeding and were either raised or should 
have been raised in a previous appeal from the conviction, 
the trial court properly granted respondent's motion to 
dismiss the petition. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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